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T

wentieth-century writers have repeatedly claimed that the violent events of their
time were not only unimaginable but
inexpressible. At the turn of the century,
Joseph Conrad introduced the trope of the
indescribable “nightmare” in Heart of
Darkness to convey Marlow’s experience of
colonialism in Africa (Conrad 2006, 69).
James Joyce used the same metaphor in
Ulysses for Stephen’s refusal to accept a role in
Ireland’s ongoing religious and nationalist
conflicts: “History. . . is a nightmare from
which I am trying to awake” (Joyce 1986,
28). After the First World War, T. S. Eliot
blamed the difficulty of “making the modern
world possible for art” on “the immense
panorama of futility and anarchy which is
contemporary history” (Eliot 1975, 178,
177). A generation later, Theodor Adorno
declared that writing poetry after Auschwitz
was barbaric (Adorno 1967, 34). Although
these expressions of rhetorical impotence
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imply that recent events were worse than any in the past, the historical record
of heinous acts is long and vicious. Atrocities were not new, but never before
had they threatened to reduce witnesses to silence. Twentieth-century political violence was unprecedented not because it was worse but because it
occurred in a secular culture. In the past, communal beliefs had justified or
condemned the most horrific acts, but the late nineteenth-century crisis of
belief made any consensus about the meaning of violence unattainable.
This situation produced an aesthetic dilemma, because to represent violence is to give it a meaning. A dead body does not explain itself, and the
narrative of the suicide bomber is not the story of the child killed in the blast.
Derek Walcott conveys the scope of this problem in his 1962 poem “A Far
Cry from Africa”:
Only the worm, colonel of carrion, cries:
“Waste no compassion on these separate dead!”
Statistics justify and scholars seize
The salients of colonial policy.
What is that to the white child hacked in bed?
To savages, expendable as Jews? (Walcott 1986, 17)

The speaker expresses his ethical stance negatively: only a worm could be
indifferent to the “separate dead,” whether the victim is white or black,
African or European. Yet this conviction conflicts with the most basic
attempt to represent violence by counting the dead: ‘Statistics justify.’ If even
raw numbers insert victims into a tendentious discourse, how can violence
be made known?
One answer for modernists was symbolism, and Heart of Darkness became
a prototype for writing about atrocities. Conrad represents Marlow’s “nightmare” by attaching symbolic meanings to realistic accounts of historical
events. This solution, however, has become the target of scathing ethical and
political protests, notably those of Chinua Achebe and Fredric Jameson.
Turning to Roman Jakobson’s structural definition of symbolism, we can
begin to understand why so many twentieth-century writers found symbolism useful, as well as the reasons that so many critics have objected to it.
Jakobson graphs language on a horizontal axis of syntax and a vertical axis of
semantics (Jakobson and Halle 1956, 60). He compares syntax to the figure
of metonymy because both are based on contiguity, and he associates semantics with metaphor because both depend on substitution in a given position
(78). Extending this model to literary forms, Jakobson argues that realism,
which refers to observable reality, is metonymic, and symbolism, which can
evoke referents beyond sensory experience, is metaphoric.1 Just as every sentence operates on both the syntactic axis and the semantic axis, every text has
realistic and symbolic significance.
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Jakobson’s linguistic model clarifies the relation between realism and
symbolism in Heart of Darkness. The specificity of realism represents acts of
colonial violence, and the multiple meanings of symbolism frustrate attempts
to explain it. Marlow’s first words illustrate how symbolism constructs meaning by making the incomprehensible events of the present part of a pattern:
“‘And this also,’ said Marlow suddenly, ‘has been one of the dark places of the
earth’” (2006, 5). He adds, “‘I was thinking of very old times, when the
Romans first came here, nineteen hundred years ago. . .’” (5). To make sense
of his extraordinary experiences, he seeks familiar parallels, comparing the
European presence in Africa to the Roman occupation of Britain: “‘But
darkness was here yesterday’” (6). He spells out the correspondence: the “savagery,” the “wilderness,” and the “hearts of wild men” were “here” (6). The
analogy makes the symbolic relationship explicit.
In addition to historical parallels, Conrad provides rhetorical signals of
symbolism by embedding recognizable or historically plausible events in
overlapping patterns and discourses. For example, as Marlow recalls his voyage upstream, he speaks with the precision of an official report: “‘It was just
two months from the day we left the creek when we came to the bank below
Kurtz’s station’” (2006, 33). These coordinates of time and place are empirical details that establish the verisimilitude of realism. In the next sentence,
however, Marlow expresses a completely different kind of meaning: “Going
up that river was like travelling back to the earliest beginnings of the world,
when vegetation rioted on the earth and the big trees were kings” (33). The
animistic metaphors suggest an imagined world that is primordial, prehistoric, primitive, mythic. This oscillation between the empirical referent and
non-empirical associations connects historically recognizable events to multiple patterns of symbolic meaning.
The most provocative source of symbolism in Conrad’s novel is extremity. An extreme event may seem unique because it is shocking, but if it is
utterly unlike anything else, it is incomprehensible.2 Realistic descriptions of
an extreme event fail to convey its impact, yet symbolic representations seem
to evade or mitigate its gravity. Marlow’s solution is to use both strategies to
express his astonishment when he sees Kurtz’s house:
“These round knobs were not ornamental but symbolic; they were expressive and puzzling, striking and disturbing—food for thought and also for
vultures if there had been any looking down from the sky; but at all events
for such ants as were industrious enough to ascend the pole. . . .They would
have been even more impressive, those heads on the stakes, if their faces had
not been turned to the house.” (Conrad 2006, 57)

Marlow’s reaction demonstrates how objects become symbols. His initial
impression projects an empirical referent, “knobs,” but the extremity of what
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these objects really are causes them to accumulate additional meanings that
are both empirical and non-empirical. The shock of realizing that he is looking at human skulls transforms them from the “ornamental” to the “symbolic.” The “knobs” become “expressive,” “puzzling,” “striking,” “disturbing”—
they are “food for thought” as well as for vultures and ants. This multiplicity,
the capacity of the empirical object to be itself and also carry other meanings, is the strength and weakness of symbolism.
When Heart of Darkness appeared in Blackwood’s Magazine in 1899, the
proliferation of symbolic meanings was considered a strength, because it satisfied the urgent need for secular sources of meaning. Arthur Symons defends
the value of symbolism in The Symbolist Movement in Literature, which
appeared that same year. He praises the movement for fighting “against exteriority, against rhetoric, against a materialistic tradition” (Symons 1919, 9).
Symbolists created “a literature in which the visible world is no longer a reality, and the unseen world no longer a dream” (4). Writing before dreams
turned into nightmares, Symons extols the power of Symbolism to offer
access to immaterial sources of meaning. The “conscious” construction of
symbols (3), he explains, performs a spiritual function: “in speaking to us so
intimately, so solemnly, as only religion had hitherto spoken to us, [literature]
becomes itself a kind of religion, with all the duties and responsibilities of the
sacred ritual” (9). Taking the demise of faith for granted, Symons expresses
the turn-of-the-century Zeitgeist.
Charles Taylor traces the long path to this moment in A Secular Age. He
describes the gradual transition “from a society in which it was virtually
impossible not to believe in God, to one in which faith, even for the
staunchest believer, is one human possibility among others” (Taylor 2007, 3).
Taylor defines secularism not as the absence of belief but as a surplus of
beliefs. Secularism leads to a “mutual fragilization of all the different views,”
a new sense of “the fragility of any particular formula or solution, whether
believing or unbelieving” (304). More than religious faith was lost: all beliefs
seemed contingent. This instability changed the function of symbolism:
Where before the languages of theology and metaphysics confidently
mapped out the domain of the deeper, the “invisible,” now the thought is
that these domains can only be made indirectly accessible through a language of “symbols.” (Taylor 2007, 357)

While the languages of theology and metaphysics also employ symbolism,
the meaning of their symbols is constrained by foundational ideas and beliefs.
In a secular culture, however, meanings proliferate without limit. Taylor
describes this change: “where formerly poetic language could rely on certain
publicly available orders of meaning, it now has to consist in a language of
articulated sensibility” (2007, 353). Symbolism and Expressionism cultivated
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such a language to convey feelings, ideas, and beliefs. Taylor observes that
after the First World War, the ambiguity of private symbols began to count as
a liability. The war drained symbolism of its spiritual exuberance, because
“the trauma could create a sense of uncertainty, of disbelief and even cynicism. The idea could be accredited that there is no morally credible publicly
established order, the diametrical opposite of the previously established synthesis” (408). Heart of Darkness portrays the same effects of trauma much earlier.
Conrad’s competing explanations of the European presence in Africa
illustrate Taylor’s point. Marlow tells his audience that as a child he was captivated by the idea of going to Africa because it was “‘one of the blank spaces
on the earth,’” though by the time he arrived “‘it was not a blank space any
more’” (Conrad 2006, 8). His anecdote conveys a boy’s naïve wish for an
adventure that would leave a mark on the world. Others have different
motives. The Company’s doctor, for example, confides that he has a scientific interest in colonialism: “‘I have a little theory which you Messieurs who
go out there must help me to prove. This is my share in the advantages my
country shall reap from the possession of such a magnificent dependency.’”
Marlow’s aunt speaks of “‘weaning those ignorant millions from their horrid
ways,’” though Marlow considers her conception of colonialism “‘humbug,’”
and he ventures “‘to hint that the Company was run for profit’” (12). The
Eldorado Exploring Expedition comes to Africa for its riches. Although the
expedition’s name echoes Marlow’s boyhood wish, these Europeans are
nothing more than “sordid buccaneers,” no better than “burglars breaking
into a safe” (30). The variety of reasons for being in Africa—adventure,
knowledge, westernization, fortune—dramatizes the splintering of common
social purpose.
But personal motives are inadequate when they lead to violence.
Witnessing the casual and opportunistic cruelty of colonialism, Marlow
claims that a transcendent belief, an idea, is necessary to justify it:
“The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from
those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much. What redeems
it is the idea only. An idea at the back of it, not a sentimental pretense but
an idea; and an unselfish belief in the idea—something you can set up, and
bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to. . . .” (Conrad 2006, 7)

The indeterminacy of Marlow’s commitment to “an idea” reflects
Europeans’ uncertainty about the ideas that might deserve “unselfish belief.”
Unwilling to impose his own ideas on others, he is also unable to resist individuals like Kurtz who exploit secularization. Kurtz expounds most of the
big ideas circulating in Europe at the time. He is reputed to be a journalist,
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a politician of indeterminate convictions, a scientist, a painter, and a musician. He speaks of love to the young Russian and promises profits to the
Company. But by the time Marlow describes him as a “‘universal genius’”
(72), the words ironically suggest something more like a con man. In Africa,
neither external sanctions nor internal convictions restrain Kurtz from
installing himself in place of any idea. He becomes the object of worship:
“‘unspeakable rites’” are “‘offered up to him’” (50). Nor is he an isolated case:
“‘All Europe contributed to the making of Kurtz’” (49). Kurtz’s successive
identities, culminating in self-deification, show the danger of replacing communal beliefs with personal ones.
In his encounter with Kurtz, Marlow confronts the social impact of
actions based on merely personal beliefs: “I had to deal with a being to whom
I could not appeal in the name of anything high or low. I had, even like the
niggers, to invoke him—himself—his own exalted and incredible degradation” (Conrad 2006, 66). The parallel between setting up an idea and setting
up oneself as something to “bow down before” demonstrates how easy it is to
conflate grand ideas and selfish desires.The two men have no shared beliefs to
ground the meaning of their words. Their impasse is not uncommon, and
Marlow calls attention to other examples of the malleability of language. In
the colonial vocabulary, natives are “enemies” (14), and indentured African
laborers are “criminals” (16). Told that Kurtz’s victims were rebels, Marlow
exclaims, “‘Rebels! What would be the next definition I was to hear? There
had been enemies, criminals, workers—and these were rebels’” (58). This
instability of meaning gives his conversations with Kurtz “the terrific suggestiveness of words heard in dreams, of phrases spoken in nightmares” (66).
The most memorable of the nightmarish phrases are Kurtz’s last words:
“‘The horror! The horror!’” (Conrad 2006, 69). Spoken in a state of “extremity” (70), these words evoke many possible meanings. Marlow ponders them
at length. By the time he visits Kurtz’s Intended, the possibilities even include
her name: “‘The last word he pronounced was—your name’” (77). This
ambiguity troubles critics. Patrick Brantlinger, for example, cites the diversity of interpretations of Kurtz’s utterance as evidence that the symbolism in
the text cancels “external referents” (Brantlinger 2006, 389): “Conrad overlays the political and moral content of his novella with symbolic and mythic patterns that divert attention from Kurtz and the Congo to misty halos and
moonshine” (387).
In contrast to Brantlinger’s uneasiness with multiple meanings, Marlow
accepts uncertainty. He interprets Kurtz’s cry symbolically, that is, as the
foundation of a structure that allows all these possibilities: “‘I saw on that
ivory face the expression of somber pride, of ruthless power, of craven terror—of an intense and hopeless despair’” (Conrad 2006, 69). Whatever Kurtz
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means by “The horror!” the word constitutes a judgment. And for Marlow,
the judgment itself is less important than Kurtz’s willingness to judge. In the
absence of moral principles, “‘He had summed up—he had judged. ‘The
horror!’ He was a remarkable man’” (70). In a secular period, this passes as an
achievement: “‘After all, this was the expression of some sort of belief; it had
candor, it had conviction, it had a vibrating note of revolt in its whisper, it
had the appalling face of glimpsed truth—the strange commingling of desire
and hate’” (70). Although Kurtz’s last words affirm no particular meaning,
Marlow concludes that their possible meanings are profound.
Ian Watt suggests that this indeterminacy is a weakness in the narrative.
Heart of Darkness, he writes, “belongs to a specifically symbolic tradition of
fiction, and it is the only one of Conrad’s novels which does” (Watt 1979,
188). Watt recognizes that Conrad’s symbolism is a response to “the intellectual crisis of the late nineteenth century, a crisis by now most familiar to literary history in its twin manifestations of the death of God and the disappearance of the omniscient author” (181). Like Taylor, Watt notes that the
relation between particular objects or events and “some larger, nonliteral
meaning” was not controversial when “everything in the outside world was
widely agreed to constitute a fixed order, in which each item had its appropriate religious, moral, or social role” (181). Once this order disappeared, personal meanings made symbolism more ambiguous, and Watt questions the
value of this change: “There is some doubt, however, whether either impressionism or symbolism stand for meanings which are sufficiently clear to be
worth using” (181). This doubt is the negative side of symbolic indeterminacy, and it is the basis of many objections to Heart of Darkness.
Perhaps the most influential objection is Chinua Achebe’s incendiary
charge that Heart of Darkness is a racist text. His argument is based on
Conrad’s mixture of symbolism and historical realism. Achebe cites specific
passages that are clearly racist, but he does not rely on this evidence, because
it “might be contended, of course, that the attitude to the African in Heart of
Darkness is not Conrad’s but that of his fictional narrator, Marlow, and that
far from endorsing it Conrad might indeed be holding it up to irony and
criticism” (Achebe 2006, 342). Instead, Achebe targets the symbolic elements
of a text that refers to recognizable events, people, and places. He attacks the
rhetoric that signals symbolic meanings by repeating F. R. Leavis’s objections
to Conrad’s “‘adjectival insistence upon inexpressible and incomprehensible
mystery’” in sentences such as, “It was the stillness of an implacable force
brooding over an inscrutable intention” (Achebe 2006, 338).3 Achebe considers this kind of discourse irresponsible:
When a writer, while pretending to record scenes, incidents and their
impact is in reality engaged in inducing hypnotic stupor in his readers
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through a bombardment of emotive words and other forms of trickery
much more has to be at stake than stylistic felicity. (Achebe 2006, 338)

Distrusting a style that reaches for more than empirical experience, Achebe
advocates realism. Almost a century into the secular age, the multiple meanings of symbolism continue to register as a form of “trickery.” Achebe reverses Arthur Symons’s assessment of visible and invisible realities and indicts
Conrad for writing about Africa symbolically:
Africa as setting and backdrop which eliminates the African as human factor. Africa as a metaphysical battlefield devoid of all recognizable humanity,
into which the wandering European enters at his peril. Can nobody see the
preposterous and perverse arrogance in thus reducing Africa to the role of
props for the break-up of one petty European mind? (Achebe 2006, 343-44)

Using Africa as a “metaphysical battlefield,” Conrad dehumanizes and
“depersonalizes” Africans (344).
Conrad, however, was more interested in actual violence than the “metaphysical” kind. Africa is not “setting and backdrop” for “the break-up of one
petty European mind”; Africa is Conrad’s subject. He shows Europeans the
“human factor” in Africa because he intended Heart of Darkness as a protest
against Belgian atrocities. In 1898 he wrote to his publisher:
The criminality of inefficiency and pure selfishness when tackling the civilizing work in Africa is a justifiable idea. The subject is of our time distinc[t]ly—though not topically treated. It is a story as much as my Outpost
of Progress was but, so to speak ‘takes in’ more—is a little wider—is less concentrated upon individuals. (Conrad 1986, 139-40)

In rhetorical terms, Achebe regards European angst as the tenor of the
metaphor and myths about Africa as its vehicle. In contrast, I am arguing that
Conrad regards events in Africa as the tenor, and the allusions to myth, psychology, politics, and art are its vehicles.The violence in the text is not a symbol of a European crisis but a brutal historical fact that Conrad represents
through a combination of empirical description and symbolic patterns,
including parallels to other times and places. The suffering of Africans was all
too obvious to him, if not to all Europeans, so he focuses on the victimizers,
asking a question that recurred throughout the century: how could ‘civilized’
people do such things?
The alternative Achebe proposes reveals the full extent of his indictment.
He wants Africans to be portrayed realistically as complex individuals whose
existence is independent of their meaning for Western readers. Achebe compares Conrad to Marco Polo, chastising both for representing an historical
population from the perspective of an outsider: “Indeed, travellers can be
blind” (Achebe 2006, 347). The West should “look at Africa not through a
haze of distortions and cheap mystification but quite simply as a continent of
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people—not angels, but not rudimentary souls either—just people” (348).
Advocating realistic narratives, preferably by native authors, Achebe sacrifices
too much. Without symbolism, there is no way out of the aesthetic dilemma
that secularism had created in Western culture.
The consequences of adhering to Achebe’s strictures are evident in
Fredric Jameson’s 2009 essay “War and Representation.” This essay is the culmination of his longstanding opposition to modernist symbolism. As he
proclaimed in “Ulysses in History” in 1982, “I believe that today, whatever
our own aesthetic faults or blinkers, we have learned this particular lesson
fairly well: and that for us, any art which practices symbolism is already discredited and worthless before the fact” (Jameson 1993, 148). Jameson condemns the “practice of symbolism itself, which involves the illicit transformation of existing things into so many visible or tangible meanings” (148).
It seems odd to consider symbolic meanings as “visible or tangible”—
Symons exalts them as the opposite of empirical experience. Jameson, however, implies that symbolism replaces material things with other “things”
called “meanings.” Like Achebe, Jameson wants things to be just things, not
a “facile affirmation that the existent also means, that things are also symbols”
(148). Symbolism is a phenomenon to be studied but not valued: “Genuine
interpretation . . . involves the radical historisation of the form itself: what is
to be interpreted is then the historical necessity for this very peculiar and
complex textual structure or reading operation in the first place” (147).
Yet when Jameson himself historicizes modernist symbolism, he demonstrates not its worthlessness but its value. A psychoanalytic concept of symbolism guides his readings in The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially
Symbolic Act (1981). Just as Freud interprets the manifest content of the
patient’s statements to discover latent thoughts, Jameson probes the narrative
surface to uncover ideology. Analyzing Lord Jim, for example, Jameson contrasts the “ostensible or manifest ‘theme’ of the novel” with its underlying
meaning, arguing that the repeated references to honor “must mean something
else” (Jameson 1981, 217; emphasis in original).The search for “something else”
is the essence of symbolism. In this case, the narrative theme stands for an
ideological meaning. Since Jameson is operating within Marxist and
Freudian systems of belief, he limits the indeterminacy that Taylor and Watt
associate with secularism. Positing a specific symbolic meaning, Jameson
argues that “modernism was itself an ideological expression of capitalism”
(236) and that it “can at one and the same time be read as a Utopian compensation for everything reification brings with it” (236).
In his interpretation of “Conrad’s ‘will to style’ as a socially symbolic act”
(1981, 225), Jameson focuses on narrative point of view. He approaches the
epistemological question of perspective through the term “scene,” because
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there is an “obsessive repetition” of theatrical terms such as “scene, spectacle,
and tableau” in nineteenth-century fiction (230). Gustave Flaubert and
Henry James, he argues, conceive of “scene” as a principle of unity: “the
structural corollary of the point of view of the spectator is the unity of
organization of the theatrical space and the theatrical scene” (231). In contrast, Conrad “undermines the unity of the theatrical metaphor” and “displaces” it “by transforming it into a matter of sense perception” (232).
Whether the narrative point of view is singular or multiple, however,
Jameson emphasizes that it depends on empirical observation.
The term “scene” is not only central to Jameson’s symbolic reading of
Conrad’s style in The Political Unconscious, but it is also the fulcrum of his
argument in “War and Representation.” No longer associated with empirical perspectives, “scene” now marks the annihilation of all perspectives.
Jameson introduces Kenneth Burke’s “dramatistic pentad,” which comprises
the elements of “act, agent, agency, purpose, and scene,” only to reject all elements except “scene” (Jameson 2009, 1533-34). Atrocities, he explains, are
“something that happens, not so much to individuals, to characters as such,
as to the landscape, which fades in and out of nightmare, its mingled dialects
now intelligible, now the gibberish of aliens” (1538). Invoking the trope of
the indescribable nightmare, Jameson claims that the repetition of the “same
scenes of carnage and flight over and over again” is “beyond history, beyond
narrative” (1538). Therefore, he argues, war cannot be represented as specific
acts conducted by and towards human beings. Only the devastation of
“scene,” not the experience of combatants or victims, can be described.
To illustrate the futility of attributing agency to individuals, Jameson cites
two accounts of the Thirty Years War. The first is Der abenteuerliche
Simplicissimus by Hans Jakob von Christoffel Grimmelshausen and dates back
to 1668. The second example is Wallenstein, the historical novel that Alfred
Döblin wrote during the First World War. Noting that Döblin imitates
Grimmelshausen’s innumerable points of view and excess of detail, Jameson
comments:
Still, we may wonder what forms the representation of agents and agency
can take under the regime of the scene, in this interminable narrative of
events and sequence of grotesque nightmarish figures, more human in their
caricaturality than any of the genuine human beings of realism or of our
acquaintance. (Jameson 2009, 1540)

Only geographical coordinates have the stability to survive this chaos:
“Scene, however, remains unnamed at this level of narrative complexity,
becoming concrete in the course of the representation” (1534).
“Nightmarish figures” are beyond the scope of realism; the “scene” of violence can be represented, but not named.
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Jameson’s narrative despair shows the cost of renouncing symbolism.
Confronting the dilemma that earlier writers faced, he confesses to “the suspicion that war is ultimately unrepresentable” (2009, 1533). Having repudiated symbolism, Jameson upholds the ethic of incommensurability that
Achebe and others promulgate. But if an event really is unique, it is meaningless. Meaning requires a pattern, a relationship between one thing and
another. While it may be true that in the maelstrom of war an individual’s
acts are futile, narrative connects one person’s experience to another’s. The
individual’s story loses its singularity, but it gains meaning in relation to other
stories. Walcott’s poem warns that the process of connecting any victim’s
experience to narrative is tendentious, and as Taylor recounts, in a secular
culture there is no consensus of belief to limit the number or nature of connections. By multiplying the narrative patterns surrounding historical events,
symbolism preserves the structure of meaning without imposing any single
meaning.
Standing at the confluence of nineteenth-century realism and turn-ofthe-century symbolism, Heart of Darkness combines these two modes to represent unimaginable political violence in a secular period. Compared to the
Symbolist ideal of dispensing with the visible world, Heart of Darkness is full
of empirical detail. Notwithstanding subsequent interpretations of symbolism as an evasion of reality, Conrad achieved his political purpose. In 1909
Edmond Morel, founder of the Congo Reform Association, called Heart of
Darkness “the most powerful thing ever written on the subject” (Simmons
2006, 192). In colonial Africa, neither law nor conscience restrained wellarmed Europeans far from home. As the Manager of one of the stations tells
Marlow, “‘Anything—anything can be done in this country’” (Conrad 2006,
32). Later in the century it was not necessary for Europeans to leave home
to escape sanctions. The unimaginable acts committed in Africa proved to be
portents of the atrocities of two World Wars and their aftermath. While
Achebe and Jameson object to the practice of attaching symbolic meanings
to realistic accounts of historical situations, this strategy served a secular age
by representing violence without presuming to explain it.
Notes
1

David Lodge (1977) extends Jakobson’s remarks in a detailed comparison of
realism and symbolism.
2 Michel Foucault considers transgression, which is a particular kind of extremity, inherently symbolic. In The History of Sexuality, he discusses the impact of breaking taboos about sexual discourse and claims that transgression generates meanings
beyond those of the act itself: “Something that smacks of revolt, of promised freedom, of the coming age of a different law, slips easily into this discourse on sexual
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oppression. Some of the ancient functions of prophecy are reactivated therein”
(Foucault 1978, 7).
3 See Leavis 1948, 177. Despite this critique of Conrad’s style, Leavis includes
Conrad in his canon of serious moral novelists.
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